Posts filed under 'Week 4 - Barthes'
Barthes is simultaneously interesting and challenging to read. Re his chapter entitled “The Romans in Films” - Although I understand what he means by Hollywood’s use of a sign which often times produces a “degraded spectacle” in that it is an “intermediate sign”; hence he perceives it as being “ambiguous” it seems that perhaps he goes a bit too far in his criticis, i.e. his use of language in his criticism that it is “reprehensible and deceitful”. seems unnecessarily harsh and somewhat cynical. Even though I understand what he is saying about signs, it seems to me that the nature of a sign is often “ambiguous” His example of the “fringe” seems somewhat petty. After all, “the play is the thing.” His writing is often complex and difficult to untangle. For instance, I am not really sure what he means by the last part of his final sentence. After reading, it I found myself thinking: So how does he suggest the actors in Roman films wear their hair?
Another example of his cynicism and also blunt use of language can be seen in his chapter entitled “Blind and Dumb Criticism.” For example, any reservation about culture means a terrorist position.” he makes many assumptions, i.e. “All this means in fact that one believes oneself to have such sureness of intelligence that acknowledging an inability to understand calls in the clarity of the author and not that of one own’s mind.”His premise seems to be that he has a problem with critics who brush aside schools of thoughts they disagree with by saying that they don’t understand a various philsophy. While it is understandable what he says but the degree to which it irks him and the way he writes appears to be elitist and arrogant. Perhaps critics should more responsibly account for their dislike or lack of patience with the schools they do not like. Again, he does not offer a solution to what he perceives as a problem which, therefore, makes paradoxically makes him suspect.
September 20th, 2006
Preface: I’m writing this after coming off of a red-eye flight from California, and I just realized that I left all of my readings at my apartment, so you are forewarned that I might not make a lot of sense, I will not be able to do much referencing, and I will be writing this post based entirely on notes I randomly took while reading. Despite all of this, I’m determined to at least try to make sense, even though I, too, found the readings a little dense this week. (Being an editor, it’s especially challenging to read works such as these while trying to silence the voice in my head noting run-on sentences, grammatical errors and confusing syntax.)
Anyway, I have just a few comments to make on Althusser, especially what he says on p. 162 about idealogy. He writes something along the lines of ideology being a “representation” of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence and that men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form. I wasn’t entirely sure how to take this. Does he mean that people’s beliefs are imaginary, fictional? Do we create fictions for ourselves? (Yes, probably.) And, if so, doesn’t this all essentially go back to the point that reality (or fiction, for that matter) is relative?
I kept thinking about religion as I read Althusser’s piece, and how religions are, basically, ideologies. In this context, what Althusser said about ideologies being representations of men’s imaginary relationships totally made sense to me. Althusser went on to say something on p. 165 (again, sorry for the vagueness and lack of hard quotes) about ideologies having a material existence, not a spiritual existence. In relation to religion, I totally agreed with this, in terms of how religions use symbols or idols as representation (and even spectacle), making the ideology material. But, I wondered, does that make the religion any less valid? I mean, I guess what I’m getting at is the question: is Althusser saying that ideologies being material is a bad thing?
In all of the readings so far, I’ve had at least one or two “Aha!” moments (forgive the cliche), where I feel as though I can relate one specific sentence or thought to my own life or to the world today. In Althusser’s essay, my “Aha!” moment was when he said on p. 168 something about how every person believing in the “ideas” his consciousness inspires in him and he accepts must then act according to those ideas. Yes! The basic principle of actions speak louder than words. Could it be any simpler?
I hope some of this made sense…
September 20th, 2006
As I read and enjoyed (though I reluctantly admit the latter) Jean Baudrillard’s “Simulacra and Simulation” I couldn’t help but note the ways in which he uses Nietzsche time and time again. The obvious references to the death of god stuck out: he even uses the phrase “the death of God” on several occasions (for instance: “…as it is through the death of God that religions emerge” Baudrillard 181), referencing from Nietzsche’s The Gay Science (aka The Joyful Wisdom). But what struck me from this reading was the way in which Baudrillard took Nietzsche critique of Christianity and applied it to other simulations, particularly that of politics.
For us to draw this parallel, Nietzsche must quickly be returned to. In the afore mentioned text, philosophy’s “madman” puts forth that through science, particularly with the Copernican revolution, “we have killed [god] - you and I. All of us are his murders.” He questions what we will will do to comfort ourselves from this death - what festivals of atonement or sacred games will we invent to allow us, god’s murders to feel at ease once again. Then Nietzsche (with Nietzschean subtlety) suggests that since god has been killed, by us, God must be replaced, most likely by us, if for no other reason than to be worthy of the killing. With a tone of sarcasm, he chides us to realize what was one long ago and to step up and realize all else that goes alone with it. But then Nietzsche says, “I come to early,” noting that we are not ready for what goes alone with the deed that we have already done. Accordingly, although we were willing to murder god, we are not willing to accept the responsibility that goes along with it. Science displaced god from the center of the universe, and we are neither willing to move him from the center nor are we willing to place ourselves there, clinging desperately to a dead god, giving rise to religion after religion.
Now, let me return to Baudrillard. Through revealing that all is simulation and that the real no longer exists, Baudrillard seems to be using the same process that Nietzsche uses in the above section. Baudrillard claims that although the signs no longer represent the real, we cling to them none the less. One instance he gives is the “demand for signs of power - a holy union which forms around the disappearance of power. Everybody belongs to it more or less in fear of the collapse of the political” (Baudrillard 180). We cling so desperately to the signs, creating a critical obsession with their survival “which becomes greater the more it disappears” (Baudrillard 180), in much the same way Nietzsche saw us clinging desperately to the dead god in order to deny what we had done. As opposed to Nietzsche’s satirical question of filling the void of god with festivals of atonement and sacred games we invent, Baudrillard provides a more sympathetic understanding read of why we cling to these hollow signs (and continue to create them and attempt to believe in them): “none of our societies know how to manage their mourning for the real, for power, for the social itself, which is implicated in the same breakdown. And it is by an artificial revitalization of all this that we try to escape it” (Baudrillard 181). Although Baudrillard recognizes this as mourning a great loss, he then proceeds to show us that through the death of the real, the death of the social, the death of god that simulations, socialism and religion emerge, harkening directly from Nietzsche, yet applying this concept of death to a wider understanding.
Accordingly, Baudrillard seems to be saying that not only has god been murdered, so has the real (which to my understanding would include the science that Nietzsche feels we used to kill god - but I haven’t followed this aspect through thoroughly yet, so I’ll have to get back to you on it) and that simulations, including socialism and religions, have emerged to conceal this fact due to social demand: “power is no longer present except to conceal that there is none. A simulation which can go on indefinitly…is nothing but the object of a social demand” (Baudrillard 181). Though Nietzsche recognized that man killed god, Baudrillard notes that not only is god dead, but the real no longer exists in any form. All we are left with is simulation.
September 20th, 2006
In Simulacra and Simulations, Baudrillard states, “The only weapon of power, its only strategy against this defection [through simulation], is to reject realness and referentiality everywhere, in order to convince us of the reality of the social, of the gravity of the economy and the finalities of production” (Baudrillard 179). This statement seems very accurate when one considers the methods by which the U.S. pacifies potential (foreign state) enemies or builds existing positive relationships; the U.S. government helps build other governments’ means of production. Of course, we do not supply them with raw materials. We provide them with semi-raw materials (which we have produced) and professionals who are experienced with the U.S. methods for production. As a result, the foreign governments’ new methods of production are intertwined with and resemble (at least in some way) the U.S. production system. The U.S. government does not aim to interfere with local religions or traditions; but indirectly, through establishing new production means, the U.S. has undoubtedly altered or influenced the way locals participate in their own religions and traditions. The U.S. has used its “only weapon of power” (because, if they were so inclined, the rest of the world could overcome our military) by convincing foreign locals of the “reality of the social.” Case in point: the U.S. has never been in direct conflict with a government whose country has McDonalds.
Althusser stated that “man is an ideological animal by nature” (Althusser171). And Barthes stated that mythology is historical and not “natural” (Barthes 110). Ideology is real, as in the Ideological State Apparatuses, and is both a part of the Repressive State Apparatus and it counters the Repressive State Apparatus (one: by not completely agreeing with the Repressive SA, and two: by being dispersed as opposed to the consolidated SA). Man participates in these ISAs in daily life. I will therefore argue (for Althusser, not for myself) that what can be applied through the course of daily social life (i.e., ideology) is ‘natural’.
Myth, being derived from speech, cannot “evolve from the ‘nature’ of things” but from a historical foundation (Barthes 110). Myth is a system of signs that once directly represented an object or idea but has since been ‘reassigned’ a broader or different ‘signified’. The signified represented through myth has been altered through history into its current myth. The myth a people currently entertains is used as a lens through which they see the world around them. But since myths are particular to a group (large or small) they may not belong to a similar ‘plain’ of thought or consciousness and therefore may not directly interact with each other in daily social interactions. I will therefore argue (for Althusser and Barthes, not for myself) that what is not applied through the course of daily social life (i.e., myth) is ‘historical and not natural’.
I do not agree with the logic I have assembled in the previous two paragraphs. I believe myth is more natural than ideology. Myth, though derived from or filtered through some history, has been forced through the thoughts of individuals and peoples. I believe that the continuous shaping of a myth down through generations will create a gem of thought even though it might not be based on historical or physically tangible fact. This myth is more natural than ideology. The ISAs are shaped only be recent history and can turn on a dime, mostly because they are applied through the course of daily social life; a newspaper or new government initiative can quickly alter an ideology. This ephemeral definition of any specific ideology makes it less real or natural and more historical. - Tim Avery
September 20th, 2006
After quite literarily reading Laccan three times over, I find myself still struggling with his linguistic gymnastics. I did, however find his theory of the development of the “ideal I” (Laccan 2) to be conceptually fascinating. Building upon what several of my classmates have said, I think he is trying to assert that mental awareness of the self develops first in a child’s consciousness, followed by a holistic understanding of the physical, or “reflected” self. Laccan states “The total form of the body by which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power is given to him only as a Gestalt.” (Laccan 2) It seemed to me as though Laccan were suggesting that the concept of socialization and relation to other humans develops only AFTER a baby’s holistic awareness of their physical self, but I could be wrong. If that is Laccan’s argument, then I would take issue his sequence.
Speaking from personal experiences for a moment, I have a niece who is eighteen months old. While she was fascinated by her own reflection as an infant, (She would stare, wide eyed at herself for long periods of time.) she never really practiced mimicry in the mirror or gave us much of any sign that she understood the reflection was, in fact, HERSELF (rather than just a baby in a mirror,) until long after she had learned to interact and socialize with other members of my family. (At least well enough to recognize them, laugh or cry at them and get her immediate needs met.)
As far as points on which I need clarification, I am having trouble understanding Laccan’s idea of the fragmented body image as well as the role of the ego in his theory and where that fits into the baby’s developing personality or identity.
Moving on to the work of Roland Barthes, I think his observations on how wrestlers use their craft as a form of spectacular theater in order to model the gamut of human emotions and experiences are astute. Barthes states “The function of a wrestler is not to win, it is to go exactly through the motions which are expected of him. What the public wants is the image of passion, not passion itself. What is thus displayed for the public is the great spectacle of Suffering, Defeat and Justice.” (Barthes, Pgs. 16-19) On a similar vein to the points raised in Mary’s earlier post, the question then becomes, WHY do we need or want to see an exaggeration of our own emotions preformed for us? Why do we love to love the hero or hate the villain? And if we don’t in fact rely upon them, then why do we insist on creating them time and time again in various forms of the same good and evil story? What role does theater subsequently serve in our lives or in society? I am not entirely sure what the right answer is here but it could be that the extremity of theater causes our own lives to appear more normal in comparison, or that exaggeration helps us to pinpoint heroic traits within ourselves. I look forward to examining this point further in class discussion.
Another of Barthes’ perspectives which I found interesting were the musings in his essay “Wine and Milk.” He points out that wine is “above all a converting substance, capable of reversing situations and states, for instance, making a weak man strong or a silent one talkative.” (Barthes,58) Why humanity would depend on this liquid in situations of social awkwardness then comes as no surprise. Similar to the idea of masks at carnival, a shy man can hide behind his inebriation in order to be anyone he wants to be. (A great conversationalist, a ladies man, a shrewd businessman etc.) I do not mean to assert, however, that this “hiding” is always deliberately done, often, when one is drinking, he may drink more as a subconscious medication of, or response to, his own shyness.
“Wine,” Barthes goes on to say, “provides a sense of social morality, and is an ornament in the slightest ceremonials of French daily life.” (Barthes, 60) Its contrasting counterpart, milk, represents “strength, purity, innocence and restoration.” (Barthes, 61) It is as though Barthes is suggesting that we invent mythological social characters even to substantiate the kind of beverages we drink…. Why do we seem to enjoy or rely upon putting ourselves into character categories? Is someone really “pure” because they drink milk or “intellectual” because they enjoy wine? And again, what overarching social purpose can these categorizations solve?
Ok enough for now, see you all in class. My apologies if I got carried away, I am clearly still working a lot of this out in my head.
Courtney Riley
September 20th, 2006
I like the idea of doing a kind of cultural study with Lacan and seeking different types of mirror structures in different societies. I think in his article Lacan might have implied that the mirror stage could, to some extent, be triggered by the presence of a caregiver, in the sense that the infant may recognize something outside herself, though I don’t think this is the equivalent to the specific experience of the mirror incident that Lacan focuses on in detail. “The” blind” or otherwise impaired from seeing the mirror would be especially interesting, in that you could consider these individuals as a “blind society” and as blind individuals in a seeing society. It would be really interesting to look at (and I do believe they would exist) the kinds of equivalent experiences that a blind person might have, or someone in an extremely foreign culture to us. What moments would appear to attest to the universal nature of this concept? In what ways would the experiences be culturally informed, or actually differ in its effects and conclusions from the infant in Lacan’s studies? The other readings, like fanyang says, help to illuminate the possibilities of these avenues, but there is a great deal more that could be said or read, I’m sure.
Nonetheless, it says a lot to look at a text that does tend towards universal inclusion, similar to some of the readings we had on carnival, but unlike those readings have this one still seem so applicable after 50 years and able to inspire prospects of application moreso than of limitation in it’s “all encompassing” nature (at least, it seems that the generality and universality of some of the carnival readings were taken to be more in dispute in our discussions than Lacan so far has been). But does anyone read this “encompassment” in a more negative light, or as a more limiting than applicable concept?
On another note, I too enjoyed Baudrillard, and for some of the same reasons Barthes. Especially Baudrillard, which had some delicious moments as well as moments that made me cringe with the force of their accuracy. The essay started quickly and at full force, and for the first page or so, it was in great danger of losing me in its jargon and scholarly references, but Baudrillard manages to capture some truly illuminating ideas in his sharp and specific way. The tone and voice of Althusser’s work was a little comedic to me, and yet necessary to me, since he usually did have to repeat a particular idea in three only slightly different ways for me to find the most understandable version. Overall, I enjoyed the diversity of voice and the cross-over of ideas in this combination of readings moreso than any selection we’ve had yet. Concerning Baudrillard and Althusser, these were just some of my initial (and personal) thoughts. If only I could think of a more creative title for my post….
September 20th, 2006
The idea of “the mirror” literally and metaphorically figures into all of the readings this week.
For Lacan, “mirror stage” is the moment at which a child experiences the fundamental “spilt” in the formation of his/her subjectivity, as he/she cannot “see” the whole of his/herself other than through his/her mirrored image. “Imago” hence becomes the desired “Other” for the child, who perceives his/her own body to be fragmented. This Lacanian sense of “alienation” differs from that of Marx’s in that it has a universalizing tendency to encompass all societies regardless of its mode of production. (Although Lacan cites biological findings comparing human and animal experiences, one may still argue that his assumption is somewhat arbitrary…What about the blind? What about those who have never had any type of “mirror” in their life, not even a pond of water to look into? These were some of the questions that came up in previous discussions on Lacan.) I try to interpret it less literally than metaphorically – there is no need for a “mirror” as such to inaugurate this “split,” but the ways in which subjectivity is constituted in different societies and historical situations through “mirror-like” structures are worth probing into, if we were to achieve a fruitful criticality of the society of the spectacle.
In a sense, this was the project of Barthes in Mythologies and Althusser in ISA. While Barthes works to disentangle the signification system of myth that perpetuates the alibi of reality, Althusser speaks of the “duplicate mirror-structure of ideology” in which individual subjects are embedded (180). Barthes’ approach is deeply semiotic, and Althusser’s, political-economic. Both point to the “naturalizing” power of the “mirror image” (of language and signs, and of ideology) that has come to stand in for historical causality. When it comes to Baudrillard, “mirror” no longer exists, as the image (simulation) and reality collapse into one and the same thing. What results is a “hyperreality” that has no origin in reality and yet fuses the imaginary into the real, rendering the former indistinguishable from the latter, and leaving no room for political agency.
What is also interesting is the way in which these scholars “mirror” one another in their reference to existentialism, psychoanalysis, capitalism (except for Lacan), etc. (the French intellectual circle is a closely connected one, so we were told). We have yet to come out of the “sight” and “reality” conundrum from last week’s Marx and Debord. Are there any possibilities of going beyond the visual trap and the limitation of the sight? I began to think about Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the “desiring machine,” which was briefly hinted in Baudrillard (176). To me, the body and its sensuality may be a powerful alternative to break up the stifling reliance on “visuality” that surrounds us.
P.S.: I share with Mlinchk the feeling of “being alienated” from the “readability” of texts. Sometimes the ideas are indeed fascinating. Other times, the language seems to be “perfected” in such a way that the “form” begins to eclipse the “content” – it sounds pretty but its theoretical force is undermined by the very “excess” of its prose. (On the other hand, there are many references to the Western humanities tradition that I might not be familiar with, which likely cut into the quality of my appreciation.) Perhaps I can use your help in class!
September 19th, 2006
I agree that this week’s readings were um, challenging to say the least, but you know, what doesn’t kill me only mentally exhausts me to the point where I can’t even form a coherent thought after a while.
Like Jake, this isn’t the first time I’ve come across Lacan, Althusser, and Barthes in class but I’m still have a difficult time articulating the readings. For the purposes of this post I’m trying to approach this week’s reading like a pyramid, with Lacan as the base, and building with Althusser and culminating with Barthes at the top—all discoursing on identity.
Lacan’s essay outlines the stage at which people begin to recognize themselves in an outside image. In the mirror stage they associate an outside self with their internal self. If I’m reading this correctly (and if I’m not, feel free to flame me in the comments) the mirror stage is the first structured conception of identity that people develop.
Next, Althusser writes that after that initial stage, all of our identity and sense of self comes from socialization process that we basically have no control over. In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” Althusser starts by deconstructing the difference between Ideological State Apparatuses (what he defines as the church, the family, the educational system, trade-unions, the legal system, the communications system) and the Repressive State Apparatus (the government, the police, etc (143). These two forces combined turn individuals into subjects at an early age, long before they are capable of thinking for themselves. Of course, the dominate ISA’s always follow the ideology of the ruling class. (149)
The most important point I pull from Althusser (and that colors my reading of Barthes) is his point (and if I’m wrong, let me know) that behavior precedes ideology and not the other way around. I think it’s this essay where he references Pascal, saying that one is taught to kneel down and move their lips in prayer before they actually believe in God.
I guess what I’ve been pondering more and more is what else other than ideology creates the modern individual? If we’re not our system of beliefs then what are we? In short, how can there be no ideology? Barthes goes further and illustrates the many ways that these ideologies are passed off to us in the from of cultural myths.
Perhaps I’m missing the point of the readings, but this is what I’m stuck on.
ETA: It’s identity and ideology, the relationship between the two, whether or not the two are mutually exclusive that I’m trying to work out.
ETA 2: Too much free time at work and I came upon this post? piece from author Douglas Coupland. Disregarding the PR text at the top, it kind of relates to what we’re trying to talk about.
September 19th, 2006
I’m glad I’m not the only one who had difficulty with this week’s readings. I actually haven’t read any of them before, but it sounds like if I decide to pursue graduate study in English or Cultural Studies I will return to them again and again.
The two that I spent the most time thinking about were Lacan and Baudrillard. Though I did enjoy Barthes’ essays, his concluding section frustrated me. I am familiar with the concept of semiotics, but the intense deconstruction of the signifier, the signified and the actual sign into metalanguage and form and all that just, well, frustrated me. I’ve noticed a pattern, too. Once a reading becomes too filled with jargon and criticism-speak, I start to feel a little of that alienation we have been talking so much about. I start to wonder of the discourse I am reading is still grounded in a world I can conceive of and not some imaginary scholar’s world.
Anyway, from what I could tell, Lacan outlines the mirror-stage, which is the point at which an infant can recognize himself in a mirror. It is significant to Lacan because it marks the primordial identification of the “I” “before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it… its function as a subject.” (2) which is why he calls it the “Ideal I”. So, when the specular “I” is forced to be become the social “I”, the alienation of ourselves from ourselves comes about, which is where I start to see the connection to class. We have been discussing alienation from the objects and the world around us, but Lacan points to an even deeper alienation, that of the ego. What a sad lot we are, humans.
I think what Lacan is saying about the “I” relates to what Barthes was saying about language. All of this has to do with human beings essentially creating our world or reality or something through not just our signs and spectacles, but through our use of language in general. I think.
So, Baudrillard. I think we are reading him because again, he is deconstructing the notion of what is real and what is spectacle. It seems that he is saying that the majority of modern society is simulation or what he calls hyperreal. All things refer to themselves in order to prove themselves, or something like that, as opposed to being “reflections of a basic reality”.
“It is by the simulation of a conventional restricted perspective field, where the premises and consequences of any act or event are calculable, that a political credibility can be maintained.” He is speaking here of politics but I think it summarizes his overall point and applies to what he says about capital as well. Pure capitalism or the true free market economy, as many devout LewRockwellian libertarians would no doubt assure us, can be subject to no restrictions, conventions, rules, etc., etc., despite the fact that we are at times scandalized when we see an example of it. This is assuming that one agrees with his assertion that capital is fundamentally immoral. Here I want to be careful- should I be equating capitalism with capital? Does he mean something else entirely that I’m not aware of? I hope not.
B also semed to ring true for me in the field of politics. What he says about “the impossibility of a determinant position of discourse” was easy to see in todays political sphere. It seems candidates today do not even bother to elucidate their personal platforms through mass media (with the exception of perhaps their websites, which one has to proactively search through to find these stances). Instead, they simply situate themselves in opposition to the opposition. Bush has consistently just spoken about how if/since “the opposition” is against the war or for withdrawing, it is basically for terrorism or naziism. It is a nicely oversimplified version of what Baudrillard describes, I think. If ya ain’t with us, yer against us. Black and White. Again with the self-referentiality.
I apologize for the disjointed nature of the post. I’m out of town and my internet connection is limited by money, so I can’t go back and try to make this cogent or well, make sense.
September 19th, 2006
It’s nice to know that, whatever the class that I’m in, I will invariably end up reading Barthes, Althusser, Lacan and Baudrillard. What I didn’t expect was that I would get them all at once. But, as I’ve always found, especially with these guys, is that I have never gotten everything out of them, especially since each time they are read in a different context. With Barthes, who gets a lot of deserved attention, I wonder how he would feel about our modern day, everyday spectacle. In his essays he apprehends the wonder that we find in wrestling, dolls, home magazines, etc. While some of his choices are what would seem commonplace, he unearths what inspires us to make them prominent in our lives and why they become what some might call an obsession. Are these “things” necessary to our lives and daily existence? If so, what is it that draws us into them?
With this in mind I feel that Lacan has a lot to say. While he talks mostly upon the idea of self identification through visual contact, I think that this can be applied to why people surround themselves with the topics of Barthes’ “Mythologies”. We demand to be identified by such things to the point where our identities our reliant upon them. I liked Mary’s comment on the soap and the connection that it makes between us, our clothes and a feeling of clean. To think that our clothes are so important to our perception of ourselves that keeping them clean can become such an obsession really can be laughable.
Speaking of identifiers, has anyone else seen someone broken down and crying over the Redskins’ loss? I have, and it was a normally ‘macho’ man who would never be caught in public crying. Yet, at the sight of a 2-0 record (not to mention the winless preseason) at then end of the game he got so caught up in lambasting Burnell and company, tears started flowing. Just wondered what you might think about that?????
September 19th, 2006
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