More on the ultimate truth

Pynchon foreshadows the novel’s ending at quite literally the middle of the book: “Oedipa wondered whether, at the end of this (if it were supposed to end), she too might not be left with only compiled memories of clues, announcements, intimations, but never the central truth itself, which must somehow be too bright for her memory to hold” (76). Indeed this is how the novel ends, although we as the reader don’t know how this whole episode in Oedipa’s life actually ends (supposing there’s a distinction). This passage points to the pastiche element of postmodernism, the “complied memories of clues, announcements, [and] intimations,” as well as to the elusiveness of central truth: if the “central truth” is too bright for Oedipa’s memory to hold, it’s also too bright for ours as the reader, because Pynchon doesn’t present the “central truth” to us either. At first I considered whether Pynchon is just posturing: is there some real “central truth” that he is just hinting at but not revealing? Or is this just a convenient and deceptive way of hiding the fact that he doesn’t have a “central truth” at all? Or, better yet, perhaps there is no “central truth” for him to have and he’s bluffing, which is the best answer I could come up with. The excerpt is a summary of Oedipa’s thoughts, not necessarily Pynchon’s or the narrator’s; therefore Pynchon isn’t necessarily suggesting there is a “central truth.” The novel, for me, draws a parallel to Camus’ The Outsider in that it seems to be saying there is no point trying to impose reason on an unreasonable universe. When Oedipa tries to discover the “central truth” behind Pierce’s business dealings, it becomes one big farce.